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ABSTRACT
We examine the problem of assigning plots of land to prospective
buyers who prefer living next to their friends. They care not only
about the plot they receive, but also about their neighbors. This
externality results in a highly non-trivial problem structure, as both
friendship and land value play a role in determining agent behav-
ior. We examine mechanisms that guarantee truthful reporting of
both land values and friendships. We propose variants of random
serial dictatorship (RSD) that can offer both truthfulness and wel-
fare guarantees. Interestingly, our social welfare guarantees are
parameterized by the value of friendship: if these values are low,
enforcing truthful behavior results in poor welfare guarantees and
imposes significant constraints on agents’ choices; if they are high,
we achieve good approximation to the optimal social welfare.
1 INTRODUCTION
A village in a quaint part of country X recently received a permis-
sion to expand. Predetermined plots of land, of approximately equal
size and price, have been drawn and must be assigned to prospec-
tive buyers1. However, while similar in size and official value, plots
are not viewed as identical by the buyers: some buyers prefer living
close to the village center, others favor living in an area with a
view of the surrounding mountains, and yet others are interested
in level plots amenable to a home garden. Land ownership laws
preclude direct ownership by buyers; rather, land is leased from a
central governing body, and prospective buyers are prohibited by
law from paying each other in order to secure land plots. In other
words, land plots are to be treated as indivisible goods, and are to
be allocated without monetary transfers. Prospective buyers form
a small, close-knit community. Several of them are siblings (with
parents having lived in the village for decades), or are long-term
residents (in rented properties), with friends they’d like to be close
to. Consequently, buyers have preferences not just over plots, but
also over their potential neighbors. In fact, some pairs of buyers
only care about being neighbors, regardless of where they end up.
Thus, we are interested in mechanisms that would enable the buyers
1As it happens, one of these buyers is the sister of an author.
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to distribute the plots among themselves in a fair and efficient manner,
and account for friendships.
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Figure 1: Map of the proposed village expansion (plots are
numbered 1 − 35). Red lines denote roads.
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Figure 2: The plot graph based on Figure 1. Two plots are
adjacent if they share a border
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1.1 Our Contributions
We briefly discuss the complexity of finding an allocation that
maximizes the social welfare in the complete information scenario,
showing that this problem is NP-hard. We then focus on the setting
where each agent has at most one friend. This constraint is both
realistic and simplifies our computational problem significantly:
while our problem remains NP-hard, it admits a 2-approximation
algorithm in this case.
We then investigate our problem from the perspective of mecha-
nism design without money: can we incentivize agents to truthfully
report their plot values and friendship information? Given our ap-
plication domain, we are interested in mechanisms that are simple
to describe and participate in, while providing good social welfare
guarantees. Since our problem generalizes the one-sided matching
problem [11], a natural starting point is the Random Serial Dicta-
torship (RSD) mechanism, under which agents pick plots one by
one. We establish that RSD does not perform well in the presence
of friendships, and explore several modifications of RSD, in which
the picking order is based on friendship information. We identify
settings in which our mechanisms are truthful and produce Pareto
optimal outcomes, and provide bounds on their expected social
welfare for the case where agents have binary valuations for the
plots.
1.2 Related Work
One-sided matching markets have been studied for several decades.
Hylland and Zeckhauser [11] propose a Pareto optimal, envy-free
mechanism, which is, however, not truthful. Svensson [15] shows
that the Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) is the only truthful
mechanism that satisfies ex-post Pareto optimality, anonymity and
non-bossiness.
The social welfare of truthful mechanisms in one-sided match-
ing markets has been studied by Bhalgat et al. [3] for rank-based
valuation functions. Filos-Ratsikas et al. [8] consider the social
welfare of RSD for unit sum preferences, and show that RSD of-
fers a
√
n-approximation to the optimal social welfare in this case.
Adamczyk et al. [2] focus on binary and unit-range preferences,
and show that RSD offers a 3-approximation to the optimal social
welfare for binary preferences, and a
√
en-approximation for unit
range preferences. Christodoulou et al. [7] analyze the Price of
Anarchy (PoA) of one-sided matching markets for unit-sum prefer-
ences. They show that PoA for RSD is O(√n). Krysta and Zhang
[12] study the one-sided matching market problem under matroid
constraints. They propose a truthful mechanism and show that it
offers ee−1 -approximation of the optimal social welfare.
Bodine-Baron et al. [4] analyze a housing allocation problem
where students have an inherent friendship structure. They focus on
allocation stability and social welfare, rather than strategic behavior.
An online variant of this problem is studied by Huzhang et al. [10].
Massand and Simon [14] also consider the stability of a one-sided
matching market with externalities, but assume that agents cannot
misreport their valuations.
2 MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
We omit several technical proofs from the paper due to page limits;
these will appear in a full version of this work.
We consider a set of agents N = {1, . . .n} (land buyers) who
need to be matched to n plotsV = {v1, . . .vn }. Each agent receives
exactly one plot. Thus, the goal is to output an allocation, i.e., a
bijection A : N →V , where agent i gets plot A(i).
We represent neighboring plots using a plot graph G = ⟨V, E⟩:
this is an undirected graph where nearby plots w and v are con-
nected by an edge {w,v} ∈ E (see Figure 1). Each agent i ∈ N
has a valuation function ui : V → [0, 1] ∩ Q: ui (v) is the value i
derives from receiving plot v . Agents have friends, and care about
living next to them. We represent friendships by a weighted di-
rected friendship graph ⟨N , F ⟩, where (i, j) ∈ F indicates that i and j
are friends and the edge weight φi, j ∈ Q≥0 is the additional utility
i obtains for living next to j. We assume that friendships are re-
ciprocal, but not necessarily symmetric; i.e., (i, j) ∈ F ⇔ (j, i) ∈ F ,
but it may be the case that φi, j , φ j,i . Let F ∗ = {{i, j} : (i, j) ∈ F };
the unweighted undirected graph ⟨N , F ∗⟩ captures the presence of
friendships, but not their weights. We set φmin = min(i, j)∈F φi, j .
The quantity φmin plays an important role in our analysis: some
of our proposed mechanisms offer better performance guarantees
when φmin > 1, i.e. when the value of friendship exceeds the value
of any plot.
The utilityUi (A) of agent i under allocation A is
ui (A(i)) +
∑
(i, j)∈F
φi, j × I ({A(i),A(j)} ∈ E) . (1)
The first term in (1) is agent i’s utility from the plot she receives;
the second term is her (non-negative) externality for nearby friends.
An instance of our allocation problem is a tuple
I = ⟨N ,V, E, F , (ui )i ∈N , (φi, j )(i, j)∈F )⟩;
let A(I ) denote the set of all allocations for an instance I .
The social welfare of an allocationA ∈ A(I ) is defined as the sum
of agents’ utilities: SW(A) = ∑i ∈N Ui (A). Let OPT(I ) = maxA∈A(I ) SW(A).
Given two allocations A,A′ ∈ A(I ), we say that A′ dominates A
if Ui (A′) ≥ Ui (A) for all i ∈ N , and the inequality is strict for at
least one agent. An allocation A is Pareto optimal (PO) if no other
allocation dominates it. A non-PO allocation presents an avoidable
loss of social welfare; we are thus interested in algorithms that
output PO allocations.
We consider several special cases of our problem. We say that
an instance I is friendship-uniform if there exists a positive value
φ ∈ Q≥0 such that φi, j = φ for all (i, j) ∈ F . We say that I is binary
if ui (v) ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ N , v ∈ V . We say that I is generic if for
every i ∈ N , every pair of plots v,w ∈ V and every edge (i, j) ∈ F
we have ui (v) , ui (w), ui (v) , ui (w) + φi, j . If each agent has
at most one friend (an important assumption for the sequel), in a
generic instance no agent is indifferent between two plots, even if
one of them is adjacent to her friend’s plot.
3 OPTIMAL FRIEND-CONSTRAINED
ALLOCATIONS
We first analyze the complexity of finding (approximately) optimal
allocations under the assumption of complete information, i.e.,
when the weighted friendship graph as well as agents’ valuation
functions are known. Formally, given an instance I of our problem
and a positive rational valueT , we ask whether there is an allocation
A with SW(A) ≥ T ; we refer to this problem as SW-Opt.
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We first observe that even in the friendship-uniform case our
problem is at least as hard as Subgraph Isomorphism, and hence
NP-hard [9]. To see this, let all agents value all plots at c ≥ 0 and
each friendship at φ > 0; the maximum social welfare achievable
is n × c + φ × |F |. This welfare is obtained in allocations in which
every pair of friends receive adjacent plots; such allocations exist if
and only if ⟨N , F ∗⟩ is isomorphic to a subgraph of the plot graph
G. This observation establishes the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. SW-Opt is NP-complete. This result holds even
if there exist c,φ > 0 such that ui (v) = c for all i ∈ N , v ∈ V and
φi, j = φ for all (i, j) ∈ F .
The proof of Proposition 3.1 shows that SW-Opt is NP-hard
even if the input instance is friendship-uniform and (i) ⟨N , F ∗⟩
consists of a single clique and a collection of singletons (in which
case our problem is at least as hard as Cliqe), or (ii) ⟨N , F ∗⟩ has
maximum degree 2 (in which case our problem is at least as hard
as Hamiltonian Cycle). The reduction from Cliqe with c = 0
also shows that SW-Opt is hard to approximate.
Motivated by these hardness/inapproximability results, in the
remainder of the paper we focus on the setting where ⟨N , F ∗⟩
has maximum degree 1, i.e., it is a collection of edges (pairs of
friends) and singleton nodes. In this case, the respective subgraph
isomorphism problem reduces to finding a maximum matching
in the plot graph, which can be done in polynomial time. While
at a first glance this variant of the model may appear to be very
restrictive, it is quite natural in our setting. Indeed, buying land is a
serious commitment, so the ‘friendships’ in our context are typically
sibling relationships, or other tight and long-running connections
between households, and it is unlikely that a household is engaged
in several such connections.
Nevertheless, even this special case of SW-Opt is NP-hard. The
hardness result holds even in the friendship-uniform case and if the
plot graph G consists of a single path (i.e., plots are located along a
road) and several isolated plots.
Theorem 3.2. SW-Opt is NP-complete even if the instance is
binary and friendship-uniform, the friendship graph ⟨N , F ∗⟩ has
maximum degree 1, and the plot graph G consists of a single path
and isolated nodes.
Proof. It is immediate that this problem is in NP: we can com-
pute the social welfare of a given allocation using formula (7). To
prove hardness, we provide an NP-hardness reduction from Path
Rainbow Matching.
An instance of the Path RainbowMatching problem is given by
an integer k , and a properly edge-colored path, i.e., an undirected
path P = ⟨V ,E⟩ with vertices V = {v1, . . . ,vs }, and edges E =
{e1, . . . , es−1} such that ei = {vi ,vi+1} for all i = 1, . . . , s − 1
together with a finite set of colorsC = {c1, . . . , cq }, and a mapping
ξ : E → C from edges of P to colors such that ξ (ei ) , ξ (ei+1) for
each i = 1, . . . , s − 1. An instance ⟨k, P ,C, ξ ⟩ is a ‘yes’-instance if
there exists a subset of edges M ⊆ E with |M | ≥ k such that all
edges in M are pairwise disjoint and have different colors, and a
‘no’-instance otherwise. This problem is known to be NP-hard [13].
Given an instance of Path Rainbow Matching ⟨k, P ,C, ξ ⟩, we
construct an instance ⟨N ,V, E, F , (ui )i ∈N , (φi, j )(i, j)∈F ⟩ of our prob-
lem as follows.
We set N = {1, . . . , 2q + s}: there are two agents corresponding
to each color and s additional dummy agents. We refer to agents
1, . . . , 2q as color agents.
The plot graph (V, E) hasV = {v1, . . . ,vs ,w1, . . . ,w2q }, and
E = {{vi ,vi+1} : i = 1, . . . , s − 1}, i.e., it is a copy of the given path
instance together with 2q additional isolated plots (one for each
color agent).
The agents are friends if and only if they correspond to the
same color and all friendships have weight φ = .1: we set F =
{(2i − 1, 2i), (2i, 2i − 1) : 1 ≤ i ≤ q} and φi, j = .1 for each (i, j) ∈ F .
The agents’ plot valuations are defined as follows. Dummy agents
value all plots at 0: ui (x) = 0 for each i = 2q + 1, . . . , 2q + s
and each x ∈ V . Each color agent values ‘her’ isolated plot at
1 and all other isolated plots at 0: for each i = 1, . . . , 2q we have
ui (wi ) = 1, ui (w j ) = 0 for j , i . Also, for each edge {x ,y} with
ξ ({x ,y}) = ci one agent in {2i − 1, 2i} values x at 0 and y at 1,
and the other agent values y at 0 and x at 1. Specifically, for ev-
ery color ci ∈ C let Ei = {e ∈ E : ξ (e) = ci }, and suppose
that Ei = {{vi1 ,vj1 }, . . . , {vir ,vjr }}, where i1 < i2 < · · · < ir
and jℓ = iℓ + 1 for ℓ = 1, . . . , r . Then agent 2i − 1 values a plot
vk ∈ {v1, . . . ,vs } at 1 if k = iℓ for an odd value of ℓ or k = jℓ for
an even value of ℓ, and otherwise she values it at 0. Similarly, agent
2i values a plot vk ∈ {v1, . . . ,vs } at 1 if if v = iℓ for an even value
of ℓ or v = jℓ for an even value of j, and otherwise she values it at
0.
We claim that our instance admits an assignmentAwith SW(A) ≥
2q + 2kφ if and only if ⟨k, P ,C, ξ ⟩ is a ‘yes’-instance of Path Rain-
bow Matching. Indeed, suppose we start with a ‘yes’-instance of
Path Rainbow Matching, and letM be the respective matching.
For each edge e = {u,v} ∈ M , if ξ (e) = ci , we assign color agents
2i − 1 and 2i to the endpoints of e so that each of them is given
the endpoint that she values at 1; we assign the remaining color
agents to their preferred isolated plots, while the dummy agents are
matched arbitrarily to the remaining nodes. Then each color agent
values her plot at 1, and in addition there are k pairs of friends who
are allocated adjacent plots, so the overall social welfare is 2q+ 2kφ.
Conversely, suppose that there is an allocation A with SW(A) ≥
2q+2kφ. Suppose first there exists some color agent i withUi (A) < 1.
ThenA(j) = wi for some agent j ∈ N \{i}, anduj (wi ) = 0, so we can
swap i and j and increase the overall social welfare: even if A(i) is
adjacent to the plot of i’s friend, the loss in social welfare caused by
moving i away from her friend is at most 2φ < 1, and the gain in plot
values is 1. Thus, we can assume that in A each color agent values
her plot at 1. This means that there exist at least k pairs of friends
who are allocated adjacent plots, with each friend valuing her plot
at 1. Let 2i−1, 2i be some such pair of friends, and suppose that they
have been allocated plots vj ,vj+1. Then either ξ ({vj ,vj+1}) = ci
or ξ ({vj−1,vj }) = ξ ({vj+1,vj+2}) = ci . However, the latter case is
impossible: we defined the plot valuation functions so that at least
one of the agents 2i − 1 and 2i values both vj and vj+1 at 0 in this
case. Thus, these pairs correspond to a rainbow matching in P of
size at least k . □
On the positive side, if the friendship graph has maximum degree
1, the problem of finding an allocation with maximum social welfare
admits a poly-time 2-approximation algorithm.
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Theorem 3.3. Given an instance I where ⟨N , F ∗⟩ has maximum
degree 1, we can compute in polynomial time an allocation A∗ such
that SW(A∗) ≥ 12OPT(I ).
Proof. Our algorithm proceeds as follows.
First, we need to find a maximum matching in the graph ⟨V, E⟩;
let {{v1,w1}, . . . , {vs ,ws }} be the set of edges of this matching.
Suppose that F ∗ = {{i1, j1}, . . . , {it , jt }}, where φiℓ, jℓ + φ jℓ,iℓ ≥
φir , jr + φ jr ,ir whenever 1 ≤ ℓ < r ≤ t , i.e., the edges in F ∗ are
sorted by the total friendship weight in non-increasing order. Then
for each k = 1, . . . ,min{t , s} we allocate plot vk to ik and plotwk
to jk ; all remaining plots are matched arbitrarily to the remaining
agents. Let the resulting allocation be A1.
Second, we consider the weighted complete bipartite graph with
parts N and V where the weight of an edge {i,v} ∈ N × V is
equal to ui (v), and compute an allocation that corresponds to a
maximum-weight matching in this graph; let this allocation be A2.
We output the better of the two allocations A1 and A2 (breaking
ties arbitrarily). To see that this algorithm provides a 12 -approxi-
mation, consider an arbitrary allocation A. Under this allocation,
at most min{s, t} pairs of friends are allocated adjacent plots, so
the total utility they derive from friendship is at most SW(A1).
Moreover, the total value that the agents assign to their plots under
A is at most SW(A2). Thus, we have SW(A) ≤ SW(A1) + SW(A2),
whereas we output an allocation whose social welfare is at least
1
2 (SW(A1) + SW(A2)). Moreover, both A1 and A2 can be computed
in polynomial time, which concludes the proof. □
To summarize, for friendship graphs of maximum degree 1, SW-
Opt is NP-hard, but admits a simple 2-approximation algorithm.
In the remainder of the paper, we restrict ourselves to friendship
graphs of maximum degree 1, and ask if this constraint allows
us to find good allocations even when agents’ plot values and/or
friendships are not publicly known.
4 PLOT ALLOCATION MECHANISMS
In this section we adopt a mechanism design perspective. That is,
we are interested in deterministic/randomized mechanisms (with-
out money) that elicit valuations and friendships, and output an
allocation based on the reports; these mechanisms should be simple
to describe and participate in, and produce good allocations, even
when agents are strategic.
We consider mechanisms where agents pick plots directly: the
simplest such mechanism is the Serial Dictatorship mechanism,
where agents sequentially pick plots. Given that agents’ utilities
may depend on what other agents pick in subsequent rounds, we
require that agents should be able to efficiently compute optimal
strategies. In addition, we require agents to report friendships.
These reports are used to select the picking order, and to possi-
bly restrict agents’ plot choices. Such mechanisms are easy to de-
scribe, making the allocation procedure transparent — an important
concern in our setting.
Formally, we say that a deterministic mechanism is friendship-
truthful (FT) if no agent can increase her utility by misreporting
friendship information no matter what other agents report and no
matter which plots they pick. A randomized mechanism is univer-
sally FT if it is friendship-truthful for every choice of its random bits,
even when agents know the random bits used by the mechanism. A
deterministic mechanism is Pareto optimal (PO) if it is guaranteed
to output a PO allocation on every input; a randomized mechanism
is universally PO if it outputs a PO allocation on every input and
for every choice of its random bits.
We are now ready to discuss mechanisms for land allocation with
friends. We begin with serial dictatorship, identify its shortcomings,
and explore several ways to overcome them.We derive amechanism
that is universally friendship-truthful, poly-time computable, and
universally PO.
4.1 Serial Dictatorship
A natural starting point in our analysis is the (Random) Serial
Dictatorship (RSD) mechanism [1, 5]. In the deterministic ver-
sion of this mechanism, agents sequentially pick the plots, in a
predetermined order; in the randomized version, agent order is
chosen uniformly at random. For the one-sided matching problem,
which is a special case of our problem, the optimal strategy of ev-
ery agent under the SD mechanism is simple: she should simply
choose the best available plot. Moreover, for one-sided matching
the (R)SD mechanism is (universally) PO as long as all agents have
generic utilities. Its performance with respect to the social welfare
is well-understood; in particular, for binary utilities, a variant of this
mechanism offers a constant-factor approximation to the optimal
social welfare [2].
However, in the presence of friendships the agents’ decision
problem under RSD becomes much more complicated, as illustrated
by the following example.
Example 4.1. Consider an instance with agents 1, 2, 3, 4, and plots
v1,v2,v3,v4, arranged on a path. Let F ∗ = {{1, 4}, {2, 3}}. Suppose
that agents’ values for the plots are given by the table below and
φi, j = .4 for all (i, j) ∈ F . Consider what happens when we run the
SD mechanism on this instance, with agent order (1, 2, 3, 4).
v1 v2 v3 v4
agent 1 .5 .3 0 0
agent 2 0 .5 .3 0
agent 3 0 .7 0 .5
agent 4 0 .5 0 0
Agent 1 picks first. If he were to choose v1, agent 2 would face
the choice betweenv2 andv3 (v4 is obviously less attractive). While
she prefers v2, she realizes that if she were to choose v2, agent 3,
who is her friend, would choose the non-adjacent plot v4, so agent
2’s utility would be .5. If agent 2 chooses v3, agent 3 would pick
v2, so agent 2’s utility would be .3 + φ2,3 = .3 + .4 = .7. Therefore,
agent 2 picks v3; agent 3 picks v2 next, and finally agent 4 picks v4.
Under this scenario, agent 1 ends up several plots away from his
friend, so his utility is .5.
Now, suppose that agent 1 chooses v2 instead. While u1(v2) =
.3 < u1(v1), in this case agent 2 would pick v3, agent 3 would
pick v4, and agent 4 ends up with v1, i.e., right next to agent 1.
Thus, agent 1’s total utility from choosing v2 is .7. As his utility
from choosing v3 or v4 is at most .4, his best choice is v2, and the
resulting allocation A is given by A(1) = v2, A(2) = v3, A(3) = v4,
A(4) = v1.
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Example 4.1 illustrates interesting phenomena that arise when
using the SD mechanism. First, when deciding, agent 1 must reason
about the decisions of agents who pick their plots after him. To
choose optimally, he must know agents’ plot values and friendships:
indeed, if agents 3 and 4 had a low value for v2 and high values for
v3 and v4, he could safely pick v1, as v2 would remain available for
his friend.
Second, agent 2’s decision depends on the order of agents who
pick after him. If agent 4 picked immediately after agent 1, then
agent 1 could safely pick v1 and expect agent 2 to pick the adjacent
plot v2. Consequently, his decision is even more difficult if the
order of agents is unknown. In particular, if agent order is chosen
uniformly at random (i.e., using RSDwith hidden agent order), then,
to evaluate the expected utility for each selection, he must consider
all 3! = 6 scenarios corresponding to the permutations of the other
agents.
Third, on this instance the SD mechanism produced an alloca-
tion that is not Pareto optimal: agents 1 and 2 would benefit from
swapping their plots.
Thus, SD fails most of our criteria for a goodmechanism.While it
is simple to describe, the agents’ decision problem is far from simple
(in fact, the best upper bound on its computational complexity we
could obtain is PSPACE). Further, agents must reason about other
agents’ utilities as well as their own, and the outcome may fail to
be PO.
These difficulties mainly stem from the fact that whenever an
agent i has a friend j that comes after her in the permutation, i
must predict j’s decision. More specifically, for each available plot,
i needs to know whether j can and will pick an adjacent plot on
her turn. Clearly, this task is much easier when j’s turn follows
immediately after i: indeed, in our example, agent 2 had a much
easier time making up her mind than agent 1. Thus, we will now
explore variants of the SD mechanism that enable friends to choose
consecutively.
4.2 Choose-Together-SD (CT-SD) Mechanisms
Following the argument outlined at the end of Section 4.1, we
consider a variant of RSD where if i and j are friends, they appear
consecutively in the permutation.
Online Choose-Together RSD (On-CT-RSD) is our first imple-
mentation of this idea: at each step, the mechanism picks one of
the unallocated agents uniformly at random. The agent then picks
a plot and may declare another unallocated agent as her friend; if
so, then her friend is the next to choose a plot (but cannot declare
another friend). LetVi denote the set of plots that agent i can select
from on her turn. We say that a plotv is a singleton plot inVi if it is
not adjacent to any other plot inVi . If an agent i has a friend who
has not selected a plot yet, and i selects a singleton plot inVi , then
she will not be placed next to her friend in the resulting allocation.
Suppose first that the friendship information is publicly available,
i.e., agent i can declare agent j to be her friend if and only if (i, j) ∈
F . In this case, under On-CT-RSD the agents can compute their
strategies in polynomial time.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose that agents cannot misreport friendship
information. Then each agent can compute her optimal strategy in
polynomial time. To compute her strategy, each agent only needs to
know her preferences and the preferences of her friend (if she has one).
Proof. Since agents cannotmisreport friendships, their strategic
decisions are limited to what plot to pick. Consider an agent i ∈ N .
If i has no friends, she should simply pick the plot with the highest
value among the available plots. Now, suppose that (i, j) ∈ F . If i
picks after j, she can choose the plot that maximizes her utility,
taking her friend’s (known) location into account. Finally, if i picks
before j, she can consider all available plots, and, for each option,
check whether j would choose one of the adjacent plots at the next
step; in this way, she can determine which plot would maximize
her utility. Note that to make her decision, i does not have to reason
about the utilities of agents in N \ {i, j}. □
A further appealing feature of On-CT-RSD is that it is ordinal, in
the sense that agents make their choice based on comparing plot
values (accounting for additional value if a friend will be adjacent).
However, even if friendships are public, On-CT-RSD allocations are
not necessarily PO; in fact, as Example 4.3 shows, On-CT-RSD may
output an allocation that is dominated by a better allocation.
Example 4.3. On-CT-RSD may produce an allocation A where
another allocation A′ exists withUi (A′) > Ui (A) for all i ∈ N , even
if agents cannot misreport friendships.
Consider an instancewith agents 1, 2, 3 and plotsv1,v2,v3, where
E = {{v2,v3}}. Let F ∗ = {{1, 2}}. Agents’ plot valuations are
shown below, and φ1,2 = φ2,1 = .5. Suppose that the On-CT-RSD
mechanism picks agent 1 first, so the order is (1, 2, 3).
v1 v2 v3
agent 1 1 .9 0
agent 2 1 0 .4
agent 3 1 .1 0
Agent 1 can guarantee herself a utility of 1 by picking v1. Her
utility can be improved if she picked v2 and her friend, agent 2,
cooperates by picking v3. However, agent 2 would prefer v1 if it is
available. Hence, the plot v1 remains agent 1’s best choice, and the
mechanism produces the allocationA(1) = v1,A(2) = v3,A(3) = v2.
Now, an allocation A′ given by A′(1) = v2, A′(2) = v3, A′(3) = v1
dominates A withUi (A′) > Ui (A) for all i ∈ N .
Example 4.3 fails to produce a PO allocation: agent 2 does not
choose a plot adjacent to her friend’s because she gains more from
choosing v1 over v3 than she gains from friendship. Indeed, if we
change φ from .5 to 1, On-CT-RSD produces a PO allocation. This
observation can be generalized.
Theorem 4.4. On-CT-RSD is universally PO on generic instances
⟨N ,V, E, F , (ui )i ∈N , (φi, j )(i, j)∈F ⟩ with φmin > 1.
Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that, given an
instance of our problem with φmin > 1, On-CT-RSD produces an
allocation A, yet there exist another allocation A′ for this instance
such that Uℓ(A′) ≥ Uℓ(A) for all ℓ ∈ N and Ui (A′) > Ui (A) for
some i ∈ N . We can assume without loss of generality that under
On-CT-RSD the picking order is (1, 2, . . . ,n). Let i be the first agent
in this order such thatUi (A′) > Ui (A); note that, since our instance
is generic, this means that A(ℓ) = A′(ℓ) for all ℓ < i and hence
A′(i) ∈ Vi .
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Suppose first that i has no friends. Then under On-CT-RSD she
picks the most valuable plot in Vi and A′(i) ∈ Vi , so we have
Ui (A) = ui (A(i)) ≥ ui (A′(i)) = Ui (A′), a contradiction. Thus, we
can assume that (i, j) ∈ F for some j ∈ N .
Now, suppose that in our run ofOn-CT-RSD agent i picks her plot
after j, and hence A′(j) = A(j). Then the utility that i would obtain
by picking A′(i) in the execution of On-CT-RSD is equal to the
utility she obtains inA′; sinceA′(i) ∈ Vi , we obtain a contradiction
again.
It remains to consider the case where in our run of On-CT-RSD
agent i chooses before agent j (and then j chooses next). Then
i’s best strategy is to pick the highest-value non-singleton plot
inVi (and to simply pick the highest-value plot if all plots inVi
are singletons). Indeed, if i picks a non-singleton plot inVi , since
φ j,i > 1, agent j would necessarily pick an adjacent plot in the next
step, and, since φi, j > 1, agent i would derive a higher utility from
this choice than from any singleton plot inVi .
Suppose first that all plots inVi are singletons, and hence under
On-CT-RSD agent i picks the highest-value singleton plot in Vi .
Then A′(i), too, is a singleton plot inVi , i.e., in A all plots adjacent
to A′(i) are occupied by agents who appear before i in the picking
order, and we know that these agents are allocated the same plots
inA′. Thus, i and j are not allocated adjacent plots inA′, and hence
Ui (A′) = ui (A′(i)) ≤ ui (A(i)) = Ui (A), where the inequality holds
since under On-CT-RSD agent i picks the highest-value singleton
plot inVi . Thus, we obtain a contradiction in this case.
To complete the proof, suppose that i picks a non-singleton plot
inVi under On-CT-RSD, and therefore Ui (A) > 1. Then it has to
be the case that Ui (A′) > 1, i.e., in A′ agents i and j are allocated
adjacent plots. Thus, A′(i) is a non-singleton plot inVi , but then
we obtain a contradiction again, sinceA(i) is the highest-value non-
singleton plot inVi , soUi (A) = ui (A(i)) +φi, j ≥ ui (A′(i)) +φi, j =
Ui (A′). □
So far we have assumed that agents cannot misreport their friend-
ships. Let us now examine the role of this assumption.
Proposition 4.5. On-CT-RSD is not universally FT.
Proof. Let us revisit Example 4.3. Suppose again that agent 1 is
the first in the picking order.We argued that if agent 1 declares agent
2 as her friend, she maximizes her utility by picking the plot v1,
resulting in a total utility of 1. Suppose, however, that agent 1 picks
plot v2 and declares agent 3 to be her friend. Then agent 3 chooses
next, and picks the plot v1. Agent 2 is then forced to pick plot v3,
so that the total utility of agent 1 is u1(v2) + φ1,2 = 1.4 > 1. Thus,
agent 1 benefits from misreporting friendship information. □
However, as is the case for PO, if φmin > 1, this negative result
no longer holds.
Theorem 4.6. On-CT-RSD is universally friendship-truthful for
every instance with φmin > 1.
Proof. Clearly, if an agent has no friends, she cannot benefit
from declaring another agent to be her friend, as it would not give
her access to a better plot. Similarly, if an agent j is ‘invited’ by
i , i.e., j picks right after i because i declared j to be her friend, j
is not asked to report her friendship information, so she has no
opportunity to misreport. Now, suppose that i has a friend (say, j),
and i gets to pick a plot before j. If all plots in Vi are singletons,
then friendship information is irrelevant, and i has no incentive to
misreport. Otherwise, let v be a highest-value non-singleton plot
inVi . Then the highest utility i can hope to get in this run of the
mechanism isui (v)+φi, j , which is exactly the utility she would get
by picking v and declaring j to be her friend: indeed, since φ j,i > 1,
j would then choose a plot adjacent to v . Hence, i has no incentive
to misreport the friendship information in this case as well. □
To summarize, On-CT-RSD is an attractive mechanism if φmin >
1; however, in general it is neither universally PO nor universally
friendship-truthful. We next discuss modifying this mechanism to
avoid these issues.
4.3 Choose-Adjacent-SD (CA-SD) Mechanisms
The main reason why On-CT-RSD fails both PO and friendship-
truthfulness when φmin < 1 is that when agent i declares agent
j to be her friend, j can ‘jump the queue’, but may choose a plot
not adjacent to i’s. We now consider a mechanism that explicitly
prohibits such behavior.
Specifically, this mechanism, Online Choose-Adjacent RSD
(On-CA-RSD), proceeds identically to On-CT-RSD with one dif-
ference: if agent i declares j to be her friend and chooses a non-
singleton plot inVi , at the next step j must choose a plot adjacent
to i’s; if i chooses a singleton plot in Vi , j can then choose any
plot in Vj . Alternatively, if an agent selects a singleton plot, the
mechanism may forbid her from declaring a friend; this has no
impact on our analysis.
Note that On-CA-RSD is equivalent to On-CT-RSD if φmin > 1:
whenever an agent i chooses after her friend, she would pick an
adjacent plot if at all possible. However, in general, the mechanisms
are different: e.g., on the instance described in Example 4.3 On-
CA-RSD would output an allocation A with A(1) = v2, A(2) = v3,
A(3) = v1.
It turns out that On-CA-RSD satisfies the criteria formulated in
the beginning of this section.
Theorem 4.7. On-CA-RSD is universally PO and universally
friendship-truthful; moreover, agents’ strategies are polynomial-time
computable.
Proof. The analysis is similar to the analysis for On-CT-RSD
with φ > 1. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that, given an
instance of our problem, On-CA-RSD produces an allocation A,
yet there exist another allocation A′ for this instance such that
Uℓ(A′) ≥ Uℓ(A) for all ℓ ∈ N and Ui (A′) > Ui (A) for some i ∈ N .
We can assume without loss of generality that under On-CA-RSD
the picking order is (1, 2, . . . ,n). Let i be the first agent in this order
such thatUi (A′) > Ui (A); since or instance is generic, this means
that A(ℓ) = A′(ℓ) for all ℓ < i and hence A′(i) ∈ Vi .
If i has no friends, then under On-CA-RSD she picks the most
valuable plot in Vi ; as A′(i) ∈ Vi , we have Ui (A) = ui (A(i)) ≥
ui (A′(i)) = Ui (A′), a contradiction.
Now, suppose that (i, j) ∈ F for some j ∈ N . If in our run of
On-CA-RSD agent i picks her plot after j, we have A′(j) = A(j).
Suppose first that agent j picked a singleton plot inVj , so that the
choice of agent i is unconstrained, and hence she picks the most
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valuable plot in Vi . Then the analysis is similar to the previous
case: as A′(i) ∈ Vi , we haveUi (A) = ui (A(i)) ≥ ui (A′(i)) = Ui (A′),
a contradiction. On the other hand, if j did not pick a singleton plot,
thenA(i) is the most valuable plot among the plots that are adjacent
toA(j). Thus, ifA′(i) , A(i) thenA′(i) is not adjacent toA′(j) = A(j).
But this means thatUj (A′) = Uj (A) −φ j,i , a contradiction with our
assumption thatUℓ(A′) ≥ Uℓ(A) for all ℓ ∈ N .
Finally, suppose that in our run of On-CA-RSD agent i picks her
plot before j. Note that A′(i),A′(j) ∈ Vi . If these plots are adjacent,
then i can pick A′(i); as j will be forced to pick an adjacent plot
in the next iteration, we haveUi (A) ≥ Ui (A′). Otherwise, we have
Ui (A′) = ui (A′(i)), so agent i can obtain the same utility as in
A′ simply by choosing A′(i). This completes the proof of Pareto
optimality.
For friendship truthfulness, the proof is very similar to the proof
of Theorem 4.6: just as in that proof, an agent does not benefit
from misreporting if she does not have a friend or if she chooses
after her friend. Further, if agent i chooses before her friend j, the
maximum utility she can obtain is the higher of maxv ∈Vi ui (v)
and maxv ∈Vnsi ui (v) + φi, j , whereVnsi is the set of non-singleton
plots inVi , and she can guarantee herself that utility by reporting
truthfully.
Finally, the polynomial-time computability follows from the
description of the optimal strategies given in the previous para-
graph. □
On-CA-RSD has many attractive properties: it is simple, agents
can compute their strategies efficiently and without knowing other
agents’ preferences (not even their friends’ preferences!), and the
mechanism always produces a PO allocation. However, if agents’
value for being close to their friends is low relative to the differences
among the plot values, they may find this mechanism to be highly
problematic.
Example 4.8. Let G consist of a single edge {v,w} and n − 2
isolated plots. Every agent values w at 0 and all other plots at 1.
Suppose all friendships have value φ = .1. If agents i and j are
friends and i is the first agent to pick, then i will choose v (as she
can then benefit from being next to j) and j will be forced to choose
w and get the worst plot inV .
One may then wonder if it is possible to modify On-CA-RSD
to give an agent the option to decline her friend’s ‘invitation’ and
choose at a later point, but without having her plot choices con-
strained. There are several ways to implement this idea. For instance,
if agent i declares a remaining agent j as a friend, we can offer j the
choice of (1) picking a plot right after i , but it must be adjacent to i’s
plot (if at all possible), or (2) declining the invitation and returning
to the pool of remaining agents; we refer to this mechanism as CA-
Back-To-Pool-RSD (CA-BP-RSD). Alternatively, we can sample
a default agent order in advance (uniformly among all possible n!
orders), announce it to all agents, and then approach the agents
one by one in this order, asking them to pick a plot and to declare
a friend. If i declares j to be her friend, then j can either accept the
invitation, jump the queue and pick a plot adjacent to i’s (if such a
plot exists); or, decline and keep her place in the queue (or, even
more drastically, move to the end of the queue); we refer to these
mechanisms as CA-Back-to-Queue-RSD (CA-BQ-RSD) and CA-
Back-to-End-RSD (CA-BE-RSD), respectively. These mechanisms
seem to preserve the spirit of On-CT-RSD, but offer agents more
flexibility. Unfortunately, our next example shows that neither is
universally friendship-truthful.
Example 4.9. Consider an instance with agents 1, 2, 3, 4, and plots
v1,v2,v3,v4, arranged on a path in that order. Let F ∗ = {{1, 4}}.
Suppose that agents’ values for the plots are given by the table
below and φ1,4 = φ4,1 = .2.
v1 v2 v3 v4
agent 1 0 1 0 0
agent 2 .3 0 .1 .2
agent 3 .3 0 .2 0
agent 4 0 0 0 1
Under On-CA-RSD, if agent 1 picks first, she would pick v2, and
announce agent 4 as her friend, forcing agent 4 to pick an adjacent
plot. Under CA-BP-RSD agent 4 can decline this option, in which
case agents 2, 3, and 4 pick their plots in random order. Agent 4
chooses next w.p. 1/3, in which case she will be able to pick her
favorite plot. Thus, her expected utility is at least 1/3 > φ4,1, so she
will not confirm friendship with agent 1. Thus, under CA-BP-RSD,
if agent 1 declares agent 4 as her friend, her utility is 1.
Now, suppose agent 1 falsely declares agent 3 as her friend. Agent
3 has no reason to decline this invitation; indeed, accepting ensures
that she receives her favorite plot (rather than risk losing it to
agent 2). Thus, agent 3 accepts and picks v1. Agents 2 and 4 prefer
v4 to v3, so the first to pick claims v4 for themselves. Thus, with
probability .5 agent 4 ends up with v3, which is adjacent to agent
1’s plot. Hence, under CA-BP-RSD, agent 1’s expected utility from
declaring agent 3 as her friend is 1 + .5 × .2 = 1.1, which is higher
than her utility from a truthful declaration.
The same argument shows that CA-BQ-RSD and CA-BE-RSD
are not friendship-truthful: if the order is (1, 2, 3, 4), then agent 1
prefers declaring agent 3 as her friend.
Thus, there does not seem to be an easy way to make On-CA-
RSD more flexible while retaining universal PO and friendship-
truthfulness.
5 SOCIAL WELFARE MAXIMIZATION
So far, we focused on simplicity, polynomial-time computability
and friendship-truthfulness; the only allocative efficiency measure
we discussed was PO, which is a relatively weak requirement. We
will now derive bounds on the social welfare of the assignments
produced by On-CT-RSD and On-CA-RSD and their variants. For
simplicity, we focus on friendship-uniform instances, i.e., we as-
sume that φi, j = φ for some fixed φ and all (i, j) ∈ F . Since our
problem is at least as hard as the one-sided matching problem, we
cannot expect RSD and its variants to perform well for general
valuations; thus, we focus on binary instances.
For binary utilities, Adamczyk et al. [2] propose the following
modification of the RSD mechanism, which we call RSD∗. In each
iteration, before picking the next agent, RSD∗ asks all remaining
agents to report if they have a positive value for some available plot.
If some agents answer ‘yes’, RSD∗ picks one of them uniformly at
random, lets her pick a plot, and starts the next iteration; otherwise,
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RSD∗ arbitrarily pairs remaining agents with remaining plots and
terminates. RSD∗ reduces waste while maintaining truthfulness,
giving a 1.45-approximation to the optimal social welfare under
binary valuations; can we obtain a similar approximation ratio in
our setting?
Our first result is discouraging: On-CT-RSDmay produce assign-
ments with very poor social welfare, even if φ > 1, i.e., even in the
setting where it is PO for generic instances and friendship-truthful.
Example 5.1. Consider an instance with N = {1, . . . ,n}, V =
{v1, . . . ,vn }, where E = {{v1,v2}}. Suppose that F ∗ = {{1, 2}},
φ1,2 = φ2,1 = 100. All agents value v1 at 1 and all other plots at 0.
Under On-CT-RSD agents 1 and 2 end up in adjacent plots if and
only if one of then appears first in the picking order, i.e., with prob-
ability 2n . Thus, the expected social welfare under this mechanism
is 1 + 2 × 2n × 100, whereas the optimal social welfare is 202.
When friendships are valuable, i.e.,φ ≫ 1, we would like to avoid
the situation described in Example 5.1. This can be accomplished
by prioritizing pairs of friends, i.e., ensuring that pairs of friends
choose first, followed by agents who do not have friends. This
requires us to elicit friendship information offline, before agents
start picking plots. As we cannot assume that agents will report this
information truthfully, to fully specify such a mechanism, we need
to handle inconsistent reports: what if i says that j is her friend,
but j does not say that i is her friend? We take the conservative
approach and treat i and j as friends iff both declare this friendship.
Formally, this mechanism, Friends-First Choose-Together
RSD∗ (FF-CT-RSD∗) proceeds as follows. First, each agent reports
who their friend is (or∅ for no friends). Let P be the set of pairs {i, j}
who report each other as friends. We pick agents in the following
order: as long as there exist a pair of adjacent unoccupied plots
and P , ∅, we randomly remove a pair of agents {i, j} from P ; i
and j then choose their plots (in random order). We execute RSD∗
over remaining agents and plots once P = ∅ or no adjacent plots
are available. We analyze the performance of FF-CT-RSD∗, under
the assumption that agents cannot lie about their friendships and
φ > 1.
Theorem 5.2. Let A be the output of FF-CT-RSD∗ on a binary
instance I with φmin > 1, where agents truthfully report friendships.
Then E(SW(A)) ≥ 14OPT(I ).
Of course, since FF-CT-RSD∗ prioritizes pairs of friends, we can-
not expect it to be friendship-truthful. Thus, if friendship-truthfulness
is considered desirable, we are left with On-CA-RSD or its variants.
Specifically, On-CA-RSD, too, can be modified by pushing friend-
less agents who value all available plots at 0 to the back of the queue,
in the spirit of RSD∗; we refer to this mechanism as On-CA-RSD∗.
It can be verified that this mechanism remains friendship-truthful.
Since On-CA-RSD∗ does not prioritize friendships, we cannot
expect it to have a constant approximation ratio (consider, e.g., its
performance on the instance in Example 5.1). However, if φ > 1, we
can bound the approximation ratio of On-CA-RSD∗ in terms of φ.
Theorem 5.3. Let A be the output of On-CA-RSD∗ on a binary
instance I with φmin > 1. Then E(SW(A)) ≥ 12φ+2OPT(I ).
The positive results presented so far in this section are for the
case φ > 1. For φ < 1, positive results are more elusive. In par-
ticular, it is no longer the case that FF-CT-RSD∗ has a constant
approximation ratio.
Proposition 5.4. There exists a friendship-uniform binary in-
stance I with OPT(I ) = 2 + 2φ such that the expected social welfare
of the output of FF-CT-RSD is at most 6n + 4φ.
Proof. Consider an instance with N = {1, . . . ,n}, where n = 2k
is even, V = {v1, . . . ,vk ,w1, . . . ,wk }, E = {{v1,vi } : 2 ≤ i ≤
k} ∪ {{w1,wi } : 2 ≤ i ≤ k} ∪ {{v1,w1}}, F ∗ = {{2i − 1, 2i} : i =
1, . . . ,k}. Suppose that u1(v1) = u1(w1) = u2(v1) = u2(w2) = 1 and
all other plot values are 0.
If φ < .5, an optimal allocation assignsv1 andw1 to agents 1 and
2, so that the social welfare is 2 + 2φ. Now, under FF-CT-RSD∗ the
probability that agents 1 and 2 appear in the first two positions of
the picking order is 2n , and the probability that they appear in the
next two positions of the picking order is 2n as well; if neither of
these events happens, plots v1 andw1 will be occupied by agents
who value them at 0 (but derive positive utility from being next
to their friend), so the social welfare will be at most 4φ. Thus, the
expected social welfare of the allocation produced by FF-CT-RSD∗
is at most 2 × 2n + 1 × 2n + 4φ. □
Our last result applies not just to variants of the RSDmechanism,
but to all truthful mechanisms: the approximation ratio of any such
mechanism is at most 1 + 12φ , even if agents cannot misreport their
friendship information.
Proposition 5.5. Consider a mechanismM that has access to the
friendship graph ⟨N , F ⟩, asks the agents to report their values for the
plots, and outputs an allocation based on the agents’ report and the
friendship graph. If no agent can benefit from misreporting her plot
values underM then here exists a friendship-uniform binary instance
I = ⟨N ,V, F , (ui )i ∈N , (φi, j )(i, j)∈F ⟩ such that for the allocation A
output byM we have E(SW(A))OPT(I ) ≤
2φ
2φ+1 .
Proof. Let I1 = ⟨N ,V, F , (ui )i ∈N , (φi, j )(i, j)∈F ⟩, where N =
{1, . . . ,n} and n is even, n = 2k ,V = {v1, . . . ,vn }, E = {{v1,vi } :
2 ≤ i ≤ n}, F = {{2i−1, 2i} : 1 ≤ i ≤ k},ui (v) = 0 for all i ∈ N and
all v ∈ V , and there exists a positive value φ such that φi, j = φ for
all (i, j) ∈ F . That is, the plot graph is a star with centerv1, and each
agent has a friend and values all plots at 0. We have SW(A) = 2φ
for every A ∈ A(I1).
By the pigeonhole principle, there exists a pair of friends {2i −
1, 2i} such that mechanism M allocates v1 to 2i − 1 or 2i with
probability at most 2n . Now, consider the instance I2 that is obtained
from I1 by changing u2i (v1) to 1. Since M is truthful, agent 2i
cannot increase her utility in I1 by misreporting her utility function,
so given I2,M allocates v1 to 2i with probability at most 2n . Thus,
the expected social welfare of the allocation produced byM on I2
is at most 2n + 2φ, whereas OPT(I2) = 1+ 2φ. As n can be arbitrarily
large, the bound follows. □
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
We have analyzed the problem of allocating plots of land to buyers
who have intrinsic preferences over their neighbors. While the
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problem in its full generality offers several non-trivial computa-
tional challenges, we show that under some realistic assumptions
on buyer preferences and permitted reports, it is possible to design
simple mechanisms that maintain both truthful reporting and social
welfare guarantees.
We obtain positive results if all agents value their friendships
highly (φi, j > 1), and even stronger positive results are known in
the absence of friendships (i.e., if φi, j = 0). However, paradoxically,
the presence of low-valued friendships may result in significant
welfare loss, as shown by Proposition 5.5. To see why this may be
the case, note that even low-value friendships may distort agents’
behavior under RSD, thereby changing the allocation significantly.
We focused on RSD-like mechanisms for our problem; however,
it may also be useful to consider other approaches. E.g., we can ex-
plore market-like mechanisms, where agents are allocated identical
budgets and need to bid on plots and possibly on friendships, in
the spirit of Budish [6].
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A OMITTED PROOFS FROM SECTION 5
Theorem 5.2. Let A be the output of FF-CT-RSD∗ on a binary
instance I with φmin > 1, where agents truthfully report friendships.
Then E(SW(A)) ≥ 14OPT(I ).
Proof. Consider the FF-CT-RSD * at iteration t ; we define N t
be the left (unassigned) agents at time t , Gt be the topology un-
allocated plots at time t with vertex set Vt and edges Et , F t be
the singular friendship structure among N t , OPTt be the optimal
allocation of N t to the plot topology Gt and SWt be the total
social welfare by the algorithm by time t . We denote the past his-
tory of plot assignment before the t-th iteration as H t . We note
that the SW(A) = SWT (T be the total number of iterations) and
SW(OPT) = SW(OPT0). Now, at each iteration t , we divide all
friendship pairs into four sets as follows:
Z t1 = {(i, j) ∈ F t : ul (OPTt ) = 1 + φ; l = i, j}
Z t2 = {(i, j) ∈ F t : ui (OPTt ) + uj (OPTt ) = 2φ + 1}
Z t3 = {(i, j) ∈ F t : ul (OPTt ) = φ; l = i, j}
Z t4 = {(i, j) ∈ F t : ul (OPTt ) ≤ 1; l = i, j}
For convenience, we write |Z ti | = zti for all i = 1, . . . , 4 and |F t | =
f t . As friendship value φ > 1, at iteration t , if the first while loop
runs then the randomly chosen pair will always be able to capture
two adjacent plots due to higher friendship value φ than plot values
and availability of adjacent plots. which implies that
E[SWt+1 |H t ] ≥ SWt + z
t
1
f t
(2φ+2)+ z
t
2
f t
(2φ+1)+ z
t
3 + z
t
4
f t
(2φ) (2)
Now, we analyze the decrease in the optimal welfare after each
iteration when the first while loop condition satisfies (Et , ∅
and F t , ∅). Consider randomly selected pair (i, j) at iteration t ,
they will grab any available adjacent plots among available plots
(v,w) ∈ Et due to higher friendship value than plot values. If
randomly chosen (i, j) ∈ Z t1 ∪ Z t2 ∪ Z t3 , then (i, j) can destroy at
most 2 allocated adjacent plots to friends in OPTt allocation and
their own friendship. Therefor, it can cost at most 6φ in friendship
value of the OPTt allocation and if (i, j) ∈ Z t4 then it can cost at
most 4φ in friendship value of the OPTt allocation. Moreover, in
the case when (i, j) ∈ Z t1 ∪ Z t2 ∪ Z t4 , by grabbing adjacent plots
(v,w), it can disturb at most 4 assigned plot (with value 1) in OPTt
allocation and when (i, j) ∈ Z t3 , by grabbing adjacent plots (v,w),
it can disturb at most 2 plot values in OPTt allocation. Therefore
we can write using equation 2;
E[SW(OPTt+1) − SW(OPTt )|H t ]
≤ z
t
1 + z
t
2
f t
(6φ + 4) + z
t
3
f t
(6φ + 2) + z
t
4
f t
(4φ + 4)
≤ 4(2φ + 2)z
t
1
f t
+
4(2φ + 1)zt2
f t
+
8φ(zt3 + zt4)
f t
≤ 4 · E[SWt+1 − SWt |H t ]
Once all pairs of friends or adjacent edges in the topology are
exhausted (F t = ∅ or Et = ∅), our algorithm becomes random
serial dictatorship in one-sided matching market. Theorem 2 in [2]
implies that
E[SW(OPTt+1) − SW(OPTt )|H t ] ≤
3 · E[SWt+1 − SWt |H t ] ≤ 4 · E[SWt+1 − SWt |H t ]
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This implies that the sequence of random variables X 0 = 0 and
X t −X t−1 = 4 · (SWt − SWt−1) − (SW(OPT)t − SW(OPT)t−1) is a
sub-martingale as E[X t+1 |H t ] ≥ X t . Therefore by Doobs Stopping
Theorem, we get E[XT |H t ] ≥ 0 which implies,
0 ≤ E
[ T∑
k=1
(Xk − Xk−1)
]
= 4 · E
[ T∑
k=1
(SWk − SWk−1)
]
− E
[ T∑
k=1
(SW(OPTk−1) − SW(OPTk ))
]
⇒ E[SW(A)] ≥ OPT4
This concludes the proof. □
Theorem 5.3. Let A be the output of On-CA-RSD∗ on a binary
instance I with φmin > 1. Then E(SW(A)) ≥ 12φ+2OPT(I ).
Proof. Let N t ,Gt ,Vt , Et ,H t , SWt and OPTt are defined sim-
ilar to the proof of Theorem 5.2 at t−th iteration of On-CA-RSD *.
We denote |N t | as nt for simplification. We define the subsets of
the N t as follows:
Z t1 = {i ∈ N t : i has friend j, ul (OPTt ) = φ + 1; l = i, j}
Z t2 = {i ∈ N t : i has friend j, ui (OPTt ) + uj (OPTt ) = 1 + 2φ}
Z t3 = {i ∈ N t : i has friend j, ul (OPTt ) = φ; l = i, j}
Z t4 = {i ∈ N t : i has no friend, ul (OPTt ) ≤ 1; l = 1, 2}
Z t5 = {i ∈ N t : i has no friend, ui (v) = 0,∀v ∈ Vt }
Consider t with Et , ∅, If randomly chosen i ∈ Z t1 ∪ Z t2 ∪ Z t3 ∪
Z t4 , as value of friendship φ > 1 and Et , ∅, i will declare her
friend j and pick a plot v ∈ Vt with available adjacent plot with
maximizing her own utility then if possible her friends utility. If
i ∈ N t \ (Z t1 ∪ Z t2 ∪ Z t3 ∪ Z t4 ∪ Z t5 ), i will pick a plot with value 1.
We note that the On-CA-RSD never picks i ∈ Z t5 . This implies
E[SWt+1 |H t ] ≥ SWt + z
t
1
nt
(2φ + 2) + z
t
2
2 (2φ + 1)
+
(zt3 + zt4)2φ
nt
+ 1 − (z
t
1 + z
t
2 + z
t
3 + z
t
4 + z
t
5)
nt
(3)
We now analyse the decrease in optimal welfare at iteration t when-
ever Et , φ. If the randomly chosen agent i at iteration t belongs
to Z t1 ∪Z t2 ∪Z t3 then the agent i will pick the plotv ∈ Vt and force
her friend j to pick w ∈ Nv . Therefore in any case, by grabbing
two adjacent plots (v,w) ∈ Et , they can destroy at most 2 other
friendship values, their own friendship value in the OPTt allocation
where if i ∈ Z t4 then it can destroy at most 2 friendship values in
OPTt allocation (as they are not assigned adjacent plots in OPTt
allocation). Now, we analyse the decrease in plot values in optimal
welfare. If i ∈ Z t1 ∪ Z t4 , they can destroy at most 4 plot values in
OPTt allocation. Similarly, if i ∈ Z t3∪(N t \(Z t1∪Z t2∪Z t3∪Z t4∪Z t5 )),
it can destroy at most 2 plot values in OPTt allocation and for i ∈ Z t2
can destroy at most 3 plot values in OPTt allocation (only one of
them assigned to high valued plot in OPTt ). This implies that:
E[SW(OPTt ) − SW(OPTt+1)|H t ]
≤ z
t
1(6φ + 4)
nt
+
zt2(6φ + 3)
nt
+
zt3(6φ + 2)
nt
+
zt4(4φ + 4)
nt
+
(
1 − z
t
1 + z
t
2 + z
t
3 + z
t
4 + z
t
5
nt
)
(2φ + 2)
≤ z
t
1(2φ + 2)2
nt
+
zt2(2φ + 1)(2φ + 2)
nt
+
zt3(2φ)(2φ + 2)
nt
+
zt4(2φ)(2φ + 2)
nt
+
(
1 − z
t
1 + z
t
2 + z
t
3 + z
t
4 + z
t
5
nt
)
(2φ + 2)
≤ (2φ + 2) · E[SWt+1 − SWt |H t ]
Note that zt1+z
t
2+z
t
3+z
t
4+z
t
5 ≤ nt . Once all adjacent edges in the
topology are exhausted (Et = ∅), our algorithm becomes a random
serial dictatorship in a one-sided matching market. Theorem 2 in
[2] implies that
E[SW(OPTt+1) − SW(OPTt )|H t ] ≤
3 · E[SWt+1 − SWt |H t ] ≤ (2φ + 2) · E[SWt+1 − SWt |H t ]
By similar argument as Theorem 5.2, we obtain
E[SW(A)] ≥ OPT2φ + 2
which concludes the proof. □
Theorem A.1. Let A be the output of FF-CT-RSD∗ on a binary
instance I with φ < 1, where all agents report their friendships truth-
fully. Then E(SW(A)) ≥ φ4φ+4OPT(I ).
Proof. The proof of the theorem is similar to the Theorem 5.2.
Consider the same terminologies which were defined in Theo-
rem 5.2. First we analyse the gain in social welfare at t−th iteration
when F t , ∅ and Et , φ. We notice that the adjacent plots are
available at t−th iteration. If randomly selected pair (i, j) ∈ Z t1 then
both can obtain their maximum possible utility 1 + φ, however, it
becomes little tricky when (i, j) < Z t1 . If (i, j) ∈ Z t2 , then increment
in social welfare at t−th iteration is at least min{2, 2φ + 1}–either
(i, j) can grab the assigned plots in OPTt or they both grab their re-
spective high valued plots which are non-adjacent. Similarly, when
(i, j) ∈ Z t3 ∪ Z t4 , (i, j) grabs two adjacent plots or two non-adjacent
plots where at least one of them is getting high valued plots. Which
implies;
E[SWt+1 |H t ] ≥ SWt + z
t
1(2φ + 2)
f t
+
zt2(min{2, 2φ + 1})
f t
+
(zt3 + zt4)(min{1, 2φ})
f t
The decrease in the optimal welfare after t−th iteration should
be upper bounded by a similar quantity as Theorem 5.2. Therefore
for φ < 1 we can write:
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E[SW(OPTt+1) − SW(OPTt )|H t ]
≤ z
t
1 + z
t
2
f t
(6φ + 4) + z
t
3
f t
(6φ + 2) + z
t
4
f t
(4φ + 4)
≤
4
(
1 + 1φ
)
(2φ + 2)zt1
f t
+
4
(
1 + 1φ
)
(min{2, 2φ + 1})zt2
f t
+
4
(
1 + 1φ
)
(min{2, 2φ + 1})(zt3 + zt4)
f t
≤ 4
(
1 + 1
φ
)
· E[SWt+1 − SWt |H t ]
Now, by the similar analysis as Theorem 5.3, we obtain the desired
result.
□
Theorem A.2. Let A be the output of On-CA-RSD∗ on a binary
instance I with φ < 1. Then E(SW(A)) ≥ φ4φ+4OPT(I ).
Proof. The proof of the theorem is similar to the Theorem 5.2
and Theorem A.1. □
A.1 Mixed Integer Program
In this section, we showcase a mixed integer program (MIP) formu-
lation for the HA+X problem.
max :
∑
i ∈N
Ui (A) (4)∑
i ∈N
ai,v ≤ 1, ∀v ∈ V (5)∑
v ∈V
ai,v ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ N (6)
ui =
∑
v ∈V
[ui (v)ai,v + φ
∑
f ∈Fi
∑
v ′∈Nv
af ,v ′], ∀i ∈ N (7)
ai,v ∈ {0, 1},∀i ∈ N ,v ∈ V (8)
Equation 7 is the core of the MIP formulation, and it encodes the
utility function by hard-coding the friends and nearby functions for
each buyer and cottage. Equations 5 and 6 require that each buyer
be matched to at most one cottage, and each cottage be matched
to at most one buyer. And Equation 8 encodes the binary variable
constraints for ab,c .
